Constitutional Law -- The Legislative Subject Title Requirement by Parker, Richard H.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 9 
Number 4 Miami Law Quarterly Article 5 
7-1-1955 
Constitutional Law -- The Legislative Subject Title Requirement 
Richard H. Parker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard H. Parker, Constitutional Law -- The Legislative Subject Title Requirement, 9 U. Miami L. Rev. 431 
(1955) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol9/iss4/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE LEGISLATIVE SUBJECT
TITLE REQUIREMENT
Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject
and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be
briefly expressed in the title, and no law shall be amended or
revised by reference to its title only . ..1
The Florida Constitution provides not only substantive limitations on
the legislative process but also requires compliance with certain procedural
and formal measures. Failure to comply with these requirements of form
will result in the invalidity of laws just as certainly as had they been violative
of the most basic pronouncements of the organic law.
Noncompliance with the mandates of Article III, Section 16 resulting
in defective titling and/or drafting of statutes has caused the voiding of
otherwise desirable and valid legislation. It is the aim of this comment
to trace the history and application of the "subject-title" requirement and
to ascertain what measures must be taken by the legislator to satisfy its
demands. This effort is made in the sincere hope that, with a greater
degree of knowledge, care and preparation on the part of the legislator in
drafting statutes, three advantageous results may be had: a more stable
statutory structure, judicial decisions based to a greater degree on the merit
and substance rather than on the form of statutes, and, finally, some stem
in the steady stream of legislation which sets in issue the competency and
validity of the manner in which statutes and their titles have been drafted.
1. HISTORY
Although the civil law recognized the need for titles to statutes and
applied statutory titles as both an aid to interpretation and as a limitation
on the scope and effect of a law,2 the maxim nigrum nunquam excedere
debet rubrum 3 found no place in the English common law.4 Originally,
bills in Parliament were mere petitions to the king and were submitted to
and passed by Parliament without any title. When custom and practice
1. FLA. CONST. ART. III § 16. Hereafter, this section of the Florida Constitution
will be referred to in text and footnotes as Article 111, Section 16 or as the "Sublect-title"
rule. The portion of this section omitted in the above quotation merely requires that
the act, section, subsection or paragraph amended or revised be re-enacted and published
at length.
2. BLACK CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 83 (2d ed. 1911).
3. The black should never depart from or go beyond the red. That is, the black
ink text of the statute should not include matters which are not referred to in the red
ink title. BALLENTINE, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1948).
4. See, generally, BLAcK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 83
(2d ed. 1911); ENDLICH, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES § 58 (1888); MAXWELL,
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 41 (10th ed., Sharp and Galpin, 1953).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
did result in the titling of statutes, such titles merely served as an aid to the
legislators in identifying and recognizing proposed laws, and were usually
prepared by the clerk of the house in which the bill was first passed. These
titles were more indicative of the clerks' understanding of the proposed
legislation than of the legislators.5 Due to changes in legislative procedure
and the judicial attitude, titles to statutes are now required and are afforded
some weight in ascertaining legislative intent by the English courts. How-
ever, titles still do not greatly limit the scope, content or validity of acts
of Parliament.8
In adopting the common law of England, the several states also adopted
English procedures and attitudes towards legislative processes. However, as
early as 1798, as a result of dissatisfaction caused by the absence of a common
law subject-title rule, state constitutions required a definite relationship
between the title and subject of an act; laws whose subject matter varied
from that described in their title were held to be invalid.7 By the middle of
the nineteenth century, two other provisions had been adopted by several
of the state constitutions as further evidence of the importance placed upon
the proper drafting of statutes and their titles 8 the unity of subject rule9
and a prohibition of amendment or revision by mere reference to title.'
Today, 41 states have subject-title provisions in their constitutions."
The confusion and inequities resulting from adherence to the English
rules seem to have been the moving force behind this change from the
common law doctrine. As was stated in the often cited case of Walker v.
Caldwell,'2 wherein an attempt to amend a statute by reference to title only
was held invalid:
The title of an act often afforded no clue to its contents; important
general provisions were often found in acts private or local in their
operation; provisions concerning matters of practice or judicial
proceedings were sometimes in the same statute with matters
entirely foreign to them; the result of which was that, on many
important subjects, the statute law had become almost unin-
telligible ..... .To prevent any further accumulation of this
chaotic mass was the object of the constitutional provisions under
consideration13
5. For excellent treatments of the history and development of the common law
statutory title, see note 4 supra: I CooLFY. CONSTITUTKONAL LIMITATIONS 291-2 (8th e.d.,
Carrington, 1927); Manson, Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 I€o. L.J. 155 (1934-35).
6. MAXWFLL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 41-42.
7. The first constitutional provision demanding a relation between the title and
subject matter of statutes is found in the Georgia Constitution of 1798. See FEtUND,
STANDARDS oF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 154-55 (1917).
8. FREUNO, op. cit. supra note 7, at 155.
9. E.g., N.J. CONST. Art. IV, § 7, par. 4 (1844) ("'To avoid improper influences
which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such thines as have no proper
relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one subject and that subject shall be
expressed in its title").
10. E.g., LA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 17.
11. See Manson, Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 IND. L.J. 156 (1934-5).
12. 4 La. Ann. 297 (1849).
13. id. at 298; see Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark, 289 (1868); People v. Mahaney,
13 Mich. 481, 494 (1865); Albrecht v. State, 8 Tex App. 216, 221 (1880).
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In addition to the confusion and chaos referred to above, such constitutional
provisions were also enacted to prevent fraud and surprise with reference
to the legislature, to deter "log-rolling" and "hodge-podge" in legislation
and, perhaps most important, to provide a means of placing interested
members of the public on notice as to the subjects of legislation being
considered.1
4
The typical constitutional subject-title provision requires that each law
embrace but one subject, which subject shall be stated in the title, and that
no statute may be amended or revised merely by reference to the original
statute's title or section number. As early as 1868, the Florida Constitution
contained such a provision. 15 Article III, Section 16 or our present Con-
stitution adopted this section verbatim in 1885 and, except for a slight
amendment in 1950,16 the provision promulgated in 1868 has remained
intact.
II. THE SUBJECT-TITLE REQUIREMENT AND THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
There has been much litigation in which Article III, Section 16 has
been raised as either an offense or a defense. A great number of judicial
pronouncements construing, interpreting and applying this section have
thus resulted. Following is a summary of those rules and standards set
by the Court, culled from a study of those decisions.
Purpose: All of the forces which the several states have listed as reasons
for the invocation of the subject-title rule 7 have been, at one time or an-
other, used in the rationale of Florida decisions. There seem to be two
motives behind this constitutional provision: an orderly and honest legis-
lative structure,'8 and a means of adequately providing the public and
legislature with notice.' 9
In considering the former, the court has stressed its desire to eliminate
fraud, surprise, "log-rolling", "hodge-podge" and deception from the legisla-
14. COOLEY, Op, cit. supra note 5, at 295-296; see Nelson v. Brown, 7 So.2d 572,
575 (Ala. 1942); People v- Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 83-4, 44 N.E.2d 911, 912 (1942);
Crouch v. Benet, 198 S.C. 185, 191, 17 S.E.2d 320, 322 (1941).
15. FLA. CONST. Art IV, § 14 (1868).
16. This amendment to Article III, § 16 was passed on November 7, 1950. It
changed ". . . section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length" to"section, or subsection of a section, or paragraph of a subsection of a section, as amended,
shall he re-enacted and published at length."
17. See note 14 supra.
18. Lee v. Bigby Electric Co., 136 Fla. 305, 307, 186 So. 505 (1939) (To prevent
surprise, hodgepodge and logrolling in legislation); State ex rel. Giblin v. Barnes, 119 Fla.
405, 413, 414, 161 So. 568, 571 (1935) (To prevent the embracing of two unconnected
subjects in one act and to prevent deceptive title and surprise or fraud upon the legisla-
ture); Webster v. Powell, 36 Fla. 703, 716, 18 So. 441, 442 (1895) (to prevent fraud
or surprise by means of false or deceptive titles).
19. City of Hialeah v. State, 128 Fla. 46, 174 So. 843 (1937); Cray v. Central
Florida Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320 (1932), rehearing denied, 104 Fla. 446,
141 So. 604 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 634 (1932); Smith v. Chase, 91 Fla. 1044,
109 So. 94 (1926).
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tive system.20 The latter purpose requires that the legislature and the public
be able to rely on the title of an act to provide fair and adequate notice as
to the contents of the act.21
Rules of Application: In considering and applying the subject-title require-
ment, the court has invoked the usual canons of statutory construction. 22
The presumption arising in favor of the validity of the act is great, and,
before invalidating any statute, the violation must be substantial, plain and
free from every reasonable doubt.23 Although the application of Article
III, Section 16 has been held mandatory, 24 the existence of these presump-
tions and the enormous discretion afforded the legislature are further evi-
dences of the court's reluctance to declare invalid positive acts of legisla-
tion .25
If it is possible, the provisions of the statute not contained in the title
will be held inoperative and the rest of the act will be allowed to stand.20
However, there have been cases where the title of the act was so defective
as to vitiate the entire statute. 27
Unity of Subject: Though some constitutional subject-title requirements
require a unity of object,28 the Florida Constitution commands that each
law shall embrace one subject (and matters properly connected therewith). 29
There is a real distinction between subject and object maintained by the
court.30 The former is held to be the matter to which the act relates; the
20. See note 18 supra.
21. See note 19 supTa.
22. Gray v. Central Florida Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320 (1932), rehear-
ing denied, 104 Fla. 446, i41 So. 604 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 634 (1932) (These
six cannots of construction are: (1) on its face, every act of the legislature is presumed to
be constitutional; (2) every doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in favor of
the act; (3) if the act admits of wo interpretations, one of which would lead to is con-
stitutionality and the other to is unconstitutionality, the former rather than the
latter must be adopted; (4) the constitutionality of a statute should be determined by its
practical operation; (5) in determining its constitutionality, the courts should be guided
by its substance and manner of operation rather than by the form in which the act is case;
and (6) after indulging all presumptions in favor of the act, if it is found to be in
positive conflict with some provision of organic law, it becomes the duty of the court to
strike it down).
23. Spencer v. Hunt, 109 Fla. 248, 255, 147 So. 282, 285 (1933); State ex tel,
Terry v. Vestel, 81 Fla. 625, 628, 88 So. 477, 478 (1921); State ex tel. Moodie v. Bry4,
50 Fla. 293, 396, 39 So. 929, 961 (1905).
24. State v. Poston, 119 Fla. 699, 160 So. 875 (1935); Disston v. Board of Trustees,
75 Fla. 653, 79 So. 295 (1918 ; State v. Burns, 38 Fla. 367, 21 So. 290 (1896).
25. Cart v. Thomas, 18 Mla. 736, 747 (1882) ("Ve loath to pronounce any act
of deliberate legislation to be invalid." This dicta has echoed through nearly all cases
wherein the issue of presumption of validity is discussed).
26. E.g., Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786 (1906); State ex rel. Gonzalez
v. Palmes, 23 Fla. 620, 3 So. 171 (1887).
27. E.g., City of Miami v. Headly, 61 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1952).
28. E.g., LA. CONs?. Art III, § 16. For a case interpretive of the origin and ap-
plication of this section see Conley v. City of Shreveport, 216 La. 800, 43 So.2d 223
(1949).
29. FLA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 16.
30. Spencer v. Hunt, 109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933).
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latter being construed as the purpose(s) of the legislation."3 Hence, even
though an act may have numerous objects, so long as it has but one subject,
it will not be violative of or repugnant to Article III, Section 16.32
The greatest difficulty in ascertaining whether an act encompasses only
one subject arises in trying to determine whether the questioned provisions
are matters properly connected with the subject (i.e., merely objects of the
legislation) or whether they are without logical connection-perhaps de-
signed to accomplish separate and disassociated objects of legislative effort?'8
There is no absolute test possible.34 All that can be said is that all provisions
must be germane to or reasonably connected with the subject."n
Sufficiency of Title: The subject of each law must be briefly expressed in
the title?'1 This constitutional requirement of briefness has been virtually
ignored by court rulings that, in the absence of a deceptive or misleading
title, excessive length alone will not serve to invalidate. 37 Perhaps the most
graphic illustration of the judicial attitude towards the requirements of
brevity is Moody v. Bryan.3' In this case, the questioned title covered almost
six pages of the Florida Reports.-' The court held that this title was not
violative of the constitution even though "it is very prolix, being unduly
drawn out, contains much unnecessary matter, is cumbersome and is
awkwardly worded." 40
As to the sufficiency of expression of title generally, again, there are
few absolute rules that may be stated. It has repeatedly been held that
the title to an act need not be an index to its contents41 and those provisions
which may be reasonably inferred from the title need not be expressly
stated in the title.4 2 Yet, titles which have not expressly referred to certain
31. Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Sumpter County, 48 So.2d 912 (Fla.
1950); Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1942); Spencer v. Hunt, 109
Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933).
32. E.g., State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905) (Here,
twelve objects ranging from the establishment of the Florida: Female College through
appropriations of lands to high schools, were all held to be within the broad but single
subject of the reorganization of state special schools).
33. State ex ret. Landis v. Thompson, 120 Fla. 860, 163 So. 270 (1935); Colonial
Investment Co. v. Nolan, 100 Fla. 1349, 131 So. 178 (1930).
34. Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 91, 9 So.2d 157, 158 (1942) ("... there is
little use to attempt a review in any detail of these decisions because it is largely true
that each of them has been based upon the particular phraseology of the law tinder
consideration").
35. E.g., Smith v. Cbase, 91 Fla. 1044, 109 So. 94 (1926); Fine v. Moran, 74
Fla. 417, 77 So. 535 (1917).
36. FLA. CONST. Art. IIl, § 16.
37. Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417, 77 So. 533 (1917); State v. Bethea, 61 Fla. 60,
55 So. 550 (1911); State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905).
38. 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905).
39. 50 Fla. 301 through 50 Fla. 306.
40. State ex rel. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 392, 39. So. 929, 960 (1905).
41. Wright v. Board of Public Instruction of Sumpter County, 48 So.2d 912 (Fla.
1950); State ex rel. Watson v. Crooks, 15 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1943); Smith v. Chase, 91
Fla. 1044, 109 So. 94 (1926).
42. State ex ret. Moodie v. Bryan, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929 (1905). See City of
Ocoee v. Bowness, 65 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1953); State ex rel. Grodin v. Barns, 119 Fla. 405,
161 So. 568 (1935); Hayes v. Walker, 54 Fla. 163, 44 So. 747 (1907).
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objects of acts have caused provisions relating to those objects to be in-
validated. 43 The crux of the problem seems to be whether the title to the
proposed act put the legislators and all interested parties on notice as to
the content and scope of the act.44 Decisions of the court deal in the
nebulous and subjective intangibles of reasonableness of notice 45 and the
possibility that a reading of the title would lead all interested parties to
make further inquiry.
4"
This requirement of notice to public and legislator has been the under-
lying basis of numerous declarations of unconstitutionality, the most recent
of which was Copeland v. State.47 An amendment to the Child Molester
Act 48 attempted to change the penalties of eleven crimes to a maximum of
25 years when the offense is committed against a person under fourteen
years of age. Among the included offenses was the crime of rape for which
the maximum penalty had previously been death.49 The title to the act in
question made no mention of this change in the penalty for rape but re-
lated that the act was to amend the Child Molester Act relating to the
sentencing, commitment, treatment, parole, release and discharge of persons
convicted of certain sex offenses against, to, or with, persons under fourteen
years of age. In holding this act unconstitutional, as applied to rape, the
court said:
The title of the act is wholly insufficient to put the members of the
legislature and the public on notice of such drastic amendment in
the rape statute. 0
Amendatory Acts: The constitutional requirement of singularity of subject
and expression of that subject in the title of all legislative acts applied to
amendatory as well as original acts." The act (or portion of the act)
amended or revised must be re-enacted and published at length as amended
or revised.52 However, this and other requirements applying to amending
statutes applies only to those statutes which expressly amend or revise, and
is not intended to affect laws amending soley by implication.
43. E.g., Copeland v. State, 76 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1954); Lee v. Bigby Electric Co.,
136 FIa. 305, 186 So. 505 (1939); Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786 (1906).
44. Nichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So.2d 157 (1942); State ex Tel. Cochran v.
Lewis, 118 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792 (1953).
45. State ex rel. Watson v. Crooks, 15 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1943); Spencer v. Homt,
109 Fla. 248, 147 So. 282 (1933).
46. State Cx ret. Buford v. Daniel, 87 Fla. 270, 66 So. 150 (1914); Butler v. Perry,
67 Fla. 405, 66 So. 150 (1914).
47. 76 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1954).
48 Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28158.
49. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1953).
50. Copeland v. State, 76 So.2d 137, 142 (Fla. 1954).
51. McCord v. Conner, 132 Fla. 56, 180 So. 519 (1939).
52. FLA. CON ST. Art. Ill, § 16.
53. In re DeWoody, 94 Fla. 96, 113So. 677 (1927); Van Pelt v. Hilliard 75 FIa.
792. 78 So. 693 (1918); Lake v. State ex rel. Palmer,, 18 Fla. 501 (1882).
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Although the title of an act merely setting out the statutory section
number of the act to be amended is insufficient,5 4 a title giving the number
of the Revised General Statutes and briefly expressing the general subject
expressed therein has been held to be sufficient 55 Here again, the court's
primary concern seems to be the reasonableness of the attempted action.
56
The amending act should contain no provisions that could not have
been included under the title of the original act.17 When it is desired to
include provisions which could have been included in the original act
(being germane and objects of the legislation) but which were not men-
tioned in that title, the title of the original statute must be amended in the
amending act to give notice of the inclusion of this new matter.56
III. OBSERVATIONS
The preceding secion dealing with the interpretation and construction
of the subject-title requirement could have been treated at much greater
length by presenting a survey of all interpretive cases and the rules and
dicta stated therein. 9 However, it is the author's opinion that any more
lengthy treatment of the rulings of the past would serve no valuable end;
our concern should be with the future since the past is only valuable in
aiding our understanding of the future. Therefore the remainder of this
article will be devoted to a study of how these past decisions may affect
future decisions.
The subject title area presents a field of law in which a premium is
placed upon the subpective. Rules, other than the restatement of truisms,
platitudes and vague absolutes, are almost non-existent. The legislator
should use his reason rather than his ability to memorize form. As was
admitted by the court in Thompson v. Inter County Tel. and Tel.,60
A method by which acts or titles may be cast into one category
or another with the accuracy that the chemist obtains by the use
of litmus is not available to us. Too often . . . we must resort to
our own judgment to test the rclationship between title and
content.6'
54. McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank and Trust Co., 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931);
Webster v. Powell, 36 Fla. 703, 18 So. 441 (1895),
55. McConville v. Ft. Pierce Bank and Trust Co, 101 Fla. 727, 135 So. 392 (1931).
56. E.g., McLin v. Florida Automobile Owner's Protective Ass'n, 105 Fla. 164, 141
So. 147 (1932) (Germane particulars need not be included); State ex rel. Bonsteel v.
Allen, 83 Fla. 214, 91 So. 104 (1922) (provisions with a common connection to the
subject or which are germane to the subject need not be included in the title),
57. See note 51 supra.
58. Ibid.
59. The researcher desiring such a complete presentation will find all cases interpre-
tive of Article Ill, § 16 collected in 25 F.S.A. 808-53.
60. 62 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1952).
61. See Hart v. State, 144 Fla. 409, 198 So. 120 (1940) ("There is no absolute
rule possible").
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The ostensible inconsistencies in dicta and the apparent differences
between the cases discussed in the following text are not intended to be-
fuddle or confuse, but merely to apprise the reader. There is consistency,
wisdom and logic in the results of these decisions when the facts are con-
sidered; and this liberality of the rules set by the court presents the only
degree of certainty possible without risking injustice through formal loop-
holes in the law.
The Subject: Though most of the ffliculties arising under the subject-
title requirement surround the drafting of the title, there has been some
litigation setting in issue whether the scope of the act includes only one
subject and matters properly connected therewith. The courts have been
extremely reluctant to declare questioned acts to be duplicitous when it
has been reasonably possible to hold all matters to be germane and reason-
ably inferrable from the subject as set out in the title. Hence, an act
82
punishing those who would burn or attempt to bum property of value with
the intent to defraud the insurer was held to be broad enough to include
within the scope of its subject provisions dealing with those who would
counsel or procure the burner. 8 However, a statute64 providing for the
acknowledgement of deeds and other conveyances of land was not held to
be broad enough to include within its subject provisions regarding the effect
of failing to record a conveyance.05
The Title: The major source of litigation under the subject-title rule
seems to be the adequacy and sufficiency of the title. The court, as one
means towards the end of a fair and well ordered legislative structure, has
insisted upon a fair and well-ordered titling structure. This aim (rather
than strict adherence to the letter of law and precedent) has been the
moving force behind numerous cases causing a great deal of ostensibly
irreconcilable dicta which may only be reconciled by an awareness of the
underlying motives of the court.
Each statute and its title must be considered individually on its own
unique facts. The two different aims (notice and order) have provided
two varying schools of dicta which would seem to support opposite con-
clusions. Only the careless and unwary will rely on the false sense of
security provided by the general dictates of the court.
IV. DiFrrc Tna STArm
After reporting a series of recent Florida decisions construing Article
III, Section 16 and listing the standards set by the court (i.e., reasonable
notice, inartificial, not deceptive, etc.), one author noted that a strong
62. Fla. Laws 1931, c. 15602.
63. Hart v. State, 144 Fla. 409, 198 So. 120 (1940).
64. Fla. Laws 1873, c. 1939.
65. Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736 (1882).
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prayer might assist a draftor under these phrases.06 True, prayer should
never be discouraged, but, in this author's opinion, a greater degree of
thought and preparation in the drafting process would considerably expedite
favorable answers to these prayers. In an attempt to predict the unpredict-
able, the following outline is submitted as a guide to be used in the drafting
of statutes which will satisfy the subject-title requirement.
I. Set out the broad subject of the legislation.
11. Form a rough draft of the statute enumerating all provisions to be
included.
III. Draft the title to the act by presenting the subject defined in I,
followed by all of the objects to be accomplished as listed in II.
Check for:
(a) Classes, areas, organizations, individuals, etc., affected by the
act;
(b) Any amendment (other than amendment by implication)
effected:
(c) Those provisions in the title which repeat or restate the sub-
ject or a previously listed object.
IV. Include specific notice to I1(a), comply with amending require-
ments as to statutes affected by III(b), and eliminate 111(c).
V. Recheck each section of the statute against the title to be certain that
the title gives notice:
(a) Of the subject,
(b) Of the object(s),
(c) To all and everything affected by the legislation.
True, these five steps are simple and many of the precautions called
for have been declared to be unnecessary by the courts. However, only if the
draftor is omniscient enough to feel that his defintion of "reasonable" and
"germane" will be the same as that offered by the court on the day of the
ruling may any of the above safeguards be safely disregarded. As for the
simplicity of the above rules, the past shows the simple errors that have
caused the voiding of otherwise valid legislative efforts. Examining such
errors in the safety of retrospect, we may learn and benefit from them.
Following is such an examination of five cases illustrating typical drafting
errors which will, perhaps, tend to establish the validity and practical sound-
ness of the above outline.
The case of Carr v. ThomasT dealt with the validity of a statutory
provision making unrecorded sales of land void against all subsequent pur-
66. Alloway, Survey of Florida Law, Constitutional Law 8 Mwuti L.Q. 158, 200
(1954)1
67. 18 ERa. 736 (1882).
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chasers six months after the unrecorded transaction was effected, The court
held this provision to be unconstitutional solely because the title of the act 8
within which it was included dealt with provisions for the acknowledgement
of deeds and other conveyances of land. Finding that the subject of the
section and the title of the act had no proper connection with each other,
it was a simple matter for the court to invalidate the section.
Had the draftor stated that the act was to be one relating to instruments
conveying real estate and enumerated, as objects of the law, provisions re-
garding acknowledgements and the effect of not recording a conveying in-
strument, it is unlikely that the court could have found such a disparity
between title and subject. The two drafting errors found in this statute
(insufficient notice and too restrictive a title) could have been avoided had
a greater degree of care and preparation been exercised in the drafting of its
title.
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Palmes illustrates another defective statute.70
Here, the title declared the act to be one fixing the license tax of stevedores.
Provisions of the act attempted to set tip qualifications for stevedores and to
accomplish other ends relating to stevedores but not to the license tax. The
court, in holding the act to be unconstitutional, set out the errors of the
legislators and suggested titles that would have been held constitutional.7I
It is obvious that here the license tax was merely an object of this
statute; the broad subject was stevedores. Hence, failure to list the objects
to be accomplished and to include those objects in the title under a broad
and comprehensive subject caused the unconstitutionality of this othenvise
valid act.
The requirement of notice was put in issue in the recent case of Thoinp-
son v. Inter-County Tel. & Tel. Co.72 The questioned statute 73 was titled
as an act to define, levy and collect privilege taxes upon sales, admissions
and rentals of real and personal property within the state. A section 74 of
the act authorized the collection of this tax on property imported from
another state for use in this state. The only issue, as stated by the court,
was whether one reading the title of the act would "gather the thought or
even the suspicion that taxes were authorized against property imported from
another state for use or storage for use in this state.' 7 5 Answering this
question in the negative, the questioned section was invalidated.
Here, the defect was lack of notice and could have been remedied simply
by including this object of the legislation within those objects set out in the
68. See note 64 supra.
69. 23 Fla. 620, 3 So. 171 (1887).
70. Fla. Laws 1881, c. 3221.
71. State ex rel. Conzalez v, Palimes, 23 Fa. 620, 630, 3 So. 171, 176 (1887).
72, 62 So.2d 16 (Fa. 1952).
73. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 26319.
74. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 26319, § 6.
75. Thompson v. Inter-Country Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 So.Zd 16, 17 (Fla. 1952).
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title. Instead of reading "sale, rental and admission", had the words "use
or storage for use" been added, in all probability the section would have
passed this constitutional test.
The final two cases to be considered again illustrate the obvious and
simple errors which, resulting in disorder or failure to give adequate notice,
cause the voidance of otherwise desirable and valid legislation. Lee v. Bigby
Electric Co., Inc.7 involved an act 7 which, by title, imposed a license tax
on all persons and firms in the business of constructing certain public works.
One of the sections78 of this act attempted to tax all persons and firms who
offered to or did bid for the construction of these public works. The court
found this section to be inconsistent and irreconcileable with the title. Ex
partc Knight7"' was a habeas corpus proceeding which questioned one of the
provisions in an act 0 punishing the cutting or removing of any timber from
any lands that were or might be sold for taxes. Petitioners were convicted
under this questioned section which punished the removal of turpentine
from such lands.8 ' In declaring this section to be unconstitutional and dis-
charging the petitioners from custody, the court said,
As the provision . . is not included in the restricted subject ... as
expressed in the title, and is not matter properly connected with
such subject, the provision is inoperative and of no effect. 82
Iow simple it would have been to have defined the subjects of these two
acts and listed their objects in the title.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This comment could have been written from any one of numerous
approaches. It could have been a survey presenting a complete listing of
all holdings and their dicta. It could have.bcen more startling in the pre-
seritation of a comparison of cases which seem to almost completely con-
tradict one another. It could have enumerated all of the fact situations
considered by the court and speculated on the different decisions reached.
However, though one or all of these approaches may be desirable and ap-
propriate when other fields of law are considered, they are of little value in
the consideration of the "subject-title" rule.
The survey approach, by numerous express and implied judicial state-
ments discussed in the text, is almost valueless. A revealing comparison of
dicta would serve no useful purpose since the court does not seem to be
nearly as concerned with laying firm precedent as with reaching a fair de-
76. 136 Fla. 305, 186 So, 505 (1939).
77. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17178.
78. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17178, § 1.
79. 52 Pla. 144, 41 So. 786 (1906).
80. Fla. Laws 1895, c. 4416.
81. Fla. Laws 1895, c. 4416, § 1.
82. Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 150-1, 41 So. 786, 788-9 (1906).
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cision on the facts. And, finally, a listing and discussion of past fact situa-
tions, though of great value to historians, would be of very limited use to
the attorney.
The approach employed attempted to utilize these other approaches,
in part, but great stress was placed on the practical application of this rule
in an effort to present it as the functional, social tool it is rather than as just
another absolute legal rule. The conclusions reached are few, general, and
(of necessity) deal in great part with the jurisprudential aspects of this
constitutional rule.
The primary consideration of the courts is the purpose behind the
passage of Article III, Section 16, and the relation of the questioned statute
to this purpose. Order and reasonable notice being the two aims of this
section, statutes which would seem to violate the letter of this rule have been
upheld in the absence of confusion or lack of notice. By treating the "sub-
ject-title" rule in this manner, the evils intended to be affected by its pas-
sage are eliminated without creating a blind and arbitrary legal rule.
Advice to the legislator is also simple and general. The most glaring
and prevalent legislative error has been the restrictive and/or insufficient
title. The simple solution to this problem is, as presented in the suggested
drafting outline in the text, more comprehensive and detailed titles. No
statute has ever been voided due solely to the excessive length of its title.
When doubt exists, the subject should be set out and labeled as such and
the objects enumerated in such length and detail as to dispel all doubt.
There seem to be no improvements needed or changes desired in the
way that the courts have interpreted and applied the "subject-title" rule.
The only real need existing is that of remedying the apparent insensitivity
of the legislature to the judicial attitude. When this sensitivity is developed
in the legislature, consistent compliance with the dictates of Article i1,





Decisions arising in the federal courts through diversity of citizenship'
between adverse litigants have manifested a marked intent to conform to
state law, where applicable, since the coming of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.2
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
